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ABSTRACT
This paper explains why one in seven Americans has no health
insurance, and compares the casualty and the social insurance
models of health insurance. The paper discusses the relationship
among national health insurance (NHI), the cost of care, and the
health of the population, and it considers the prospects for NHI
in the United States in the short and the long run. Four
explanations for the absence of NHI in the United States --
distrustof government, heterogeneity of the population, a robust
voluntary sector, and lack of noblesse oblige --areevaluated in
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Proposals for national health insurance (NHI) are once again making the
headlines, as they have periodically in the United States since World War 1.1
The advocates of NHI have, as always, diverse goals: to increase access for
millions of Americana who do not have health insurance; to stem the rapid
escalation in the coat of care; to improve the health of the population and
reduce socioeconomic differentials in life expectancy. Vigorous opposition to
NHI is also not a new phenomenon. Insurance companies, physicians, and others
directly involved in the health field see it as a threat to their roles and
interests; in addition, many Americans with no direct involvement oppose
expanaion of government on general principles. The huge hudget deficit
contributes to the difficulty of enacting a major new domestic program, in
health or any other area.
How and when will the current debate over health policy be resolved?
Fifteen years ago I discussed the popularity of NHI around the world and
offered four reasons why the United States was the last major holdout.2 They
were: diatrust of government; heterogeneity of the population; a robust
voluntary sector; and less sense of noblesse oblige. In this paper I consider
whether these explanations are as relevant today as in the past. First,
however, I diacuss aeveral issues that help to put the NHI controversy in
clearer perspective. Why are so many Americana uninsured? How do conflicting
views of health insurance shape attitudes toward NHI? What ia the connection
between NHI and the coat of care? Would NHI do much to reduce socioeconomic
differentials in health?The Uninsured
With some exceptions such as Medicare, health insutance in the United
States is a private, voluntary matter. The demand for insurance, like the
demand for any good or service, depends on the consumer's ability and
willineness to pay for it. Some of the uninsured cannot afford health
insurance; othets are unwilling to acquire it. In all, they can be grouped
into six categories.
1. The poor. The largest group of uninsured consists of individuals
and families whose low income makes it unfessible for them to acquire
insurance, either on their own or as a condition of employment. About one in
five have no connection with the work force, but nearly 80% are either
employed or are the dependents of employed persons.3 The HIAA estimates that
31% of these workers earned less than $10,000 in 1989; snother estimate puts
the figure at 63%. Tn any case, it is clear that the great majority of
uninsured workers cannot afford to give up a substantial fraction of their
wages in order to obtain health insurance.
Most uninsured workers are employed in small firms, but the frequently
heard explanation, "Small employers can't afford health insurance," is as
misleading as the phrase "employer-provided health insurance." Employers
don't bear the cost of health insurance; workers do, in the form of lower
wages or foregone other benefits. A more sccurste description of the problem
would be "many workers in small firms can't afford health insurance." Note
that lawyers, accountants, computer consultants, and other highly paid
professionals organized in small firms usually have health insursnce, although
they often face extrs costs as discussed below.3
2. The sick and disabled. Many men and women who are not poor are
still unable to afford health insurance because they have special health
problems and therefore face very high premiums or are excluded from some
coverage entirely.
3. The "difficult". Some individuals are neither poor nor sick, but
have difficulty obtaining insurance at average premiums. They may be self-
employed, work in small firms, or are out of the labor force entirely. In
order to reach and service such individuals, insurance companies incur
abnormally high sales and administrative coats. They also encounter the
problem of adverse aelection: if an insurance company offers a policy to
individuals or small groups at an average premium, those who expect to use a
great deal of medical care are likely to buy, and those who do not will
refrain from buying.
4. The low users. Some people don't expect to use much medical care.
They may be in particularly good health; they may dislike going to physicians;
or, like Christian Scientists, they may not believe in the efficacy of medical
care. For them, health insurance is a "bad buy" unless they can acquire it at
a below-average premium.
5. The eamblers. Most people buy health insurance fn part because they
are risk averse. They would rather pay a fixed, known premium (even including
a charge above the actuarial level) than run the risk of a huge expense in
event of serious illness. But not everyone is risk averse about health
expenditures, or risk averse to the same degree. The gambler says "I'd rather
save the premium and take my chances."
6. The free-riders. The final category consists of individuals who
remain uninsured because they believe that in the event of serious illness4
they will get care anyway, with somebody else picking up the bill. They save
the cost of insurance and "free ride" on the coattails of those who do pay
into the health care system. There may be elements of "free riding" in the
behavior of the low users and the gamblers as well; it is often difficult to
distinguish among these three categories of individuals who are able to pay
for insurance but are unwilling to do so.
Review of the six categories reveals thar achievement of Nh is, from an
analytical perspective, rather simple; all it requires is subsidization of
those who are unable to afford insurance and compulsion for those who are
unwilling to acquire it. No country in the world achieves universal coverage
without subsidization and compulsion. The best short explanation of why the
United States does not have universal coverage is that the majority of
Americans have resisted subsidizing those who are unable to afford insurance
and have been reluctant to force coverage on those who do not obtain it
voluntarily. 6
Two Nodels of health Insurance
Part of the current debate over NNI is rooted in two conflicting visions
of how the cost of health care should be shared. We can designate one as the
casualty model and the other as the social insurance model. Casualty
insurance, which usually refers to automobile collision, residential fire, and
similar risks, is premised on the idea that premiums should (to the extent
feasible) be set according to expected loss. Other things equal, policy
holders who have better driving records or put smoke detectors in their homes
pay lower premiums, while poorer risks pay higher premiums. Social insurance,S
which is the basis for NEt, provides for extensive cross-subsidization across
different risk groups; it ignores expected loss in allocating costs.
As applied to health insurance, advocates of the casualty approach argue
that it is more efficient and more equitable than social insurance. They
assert that utilization of care depends, to some extent, on personal behavior
and choice. If premiums vary with expected utilization, individuals have an
incentive to choose healthier behaviors and to be more cost conscious in their
utilization of care for any given health condition.7 A clear example of the
former is charging cigarette smokers a higher premium than nonsmokers. This
may decrease the number of smokers, end even if it doesn't, the casualty model
advocates argue that it is fair for smokers to bear the extra cost of their
unhealthy habit.
Even when there is no possibility of altering behavior, and even if the
utilization of care is unrelated to insurance coverage, there is still an
efficiency advantage for the casualty model in any system of voluntary health
insurance. The alternative, a uniform premium for all individuals, including
those with major health problems, will discourage purchase of insurance by
those without such problems because the premium for them is unreasonably high.
Arguments for the social insurance model rely heavily on appeals to
justice, that is, to a sense of collective responsibility. In earlier times
these feelings of mutual responsibility were often evident within families and
within religious communities. In modern times many countries have extended it
to encompass the entire nation. The philosophical foundation can be discerned
in John Rawls's discussion of making choices behind a veil of ignorance.8
Suppose before you were born you didn't know if you were going to be rich or
poor, sick-or healthy; you might (assuming some risk aversion) prefer to beborn into a society that would provide health care for, say, parsons born with
a genetic disease on the same basis as those born without such a problem.
Advocates of the social insurance model also point to efficiency arguments.
Because everyone must participate, there can be savings in sales and
administrative costs that offset other efficiencies achieved through the
casualty approach.
Whether the casualty or the social insurance model is more conducive to
an efficient health care system is primarily an empirical question (interwoven
with value judgments) that cannot he answered a orion. Which approach is
more just is primarily a value question (individual versus collective
responsibility), but empirical information concerning the reasons for
variation in utilization of care is relevant. In my experience, the same
audiencesthat overwhelmingly approve charging smokers a higher premium
because they use more care, strongly oppose a premium surcharge for
individualswhose high use is attributable to genetic factors. Should
cigarette smoking turn out to have a significant genetic component, opinions
concerning the smoker surcharge would presumably change. One consequence of
the genetics revolution may be to shift public sentiment toward the social
insurance model.
NEIl and the Cost of Care
Opponents of NEIl frequently assert that universal coverage would result
in a substantial increase in the total cost of care. Both theoretical and
empirical research support the view that the lower the price of care to the
patient, the more care he or she will want to receive. The logic of this
argument suggests that those countries with universal coverage should be7
spending more on medicel care than does the United States. In fact, the
reverse is true. On a per capita basis, and adjusting for differences in real
income, the United States spends much more on medical care than any other
country. For instance, the average American spends about 4OX more than the
average Canadian, even though the difference in real income per capita is less
than 10%. And Canada spends more per capita than does any European country.
How can this be? The following discussion shows that countries with
universal coverage find other methods to contain health care spending, methods
that appear to be more effective thmn relying on financial constraints on
patients.
The most obvious source of saving under NHI is in health insurance
sdministrstion. In the United States approximately six percent of nstionsl
health expenditures is accounted for by "program administration snd net cost
of private health insurance." To this must be added seversl additional
percentage points for costs incurred hy providers for billing and other
administrative activities directly attributable to the American system of
financing care. By contrast, the Csnsdisn system of provincial health
insurance imposes minimal administrative and billing costs on providers and
psyors; the insurance plans themselves are inexpensive to run because everyone
must join and premiums sre collected through the tax system.
But savings in administrative costs are only part of the answer. Nearly
all countries with NIH rely heavily on what I call "upstream resource
allocation" (URA). The key to URAiscontrol over capital investment in
6 facilitiesend equipment, specialty mix of physicistis, and the development and
diffusion of high.tech, high-cost technologies. Such control usually results
in less excess capacity, both in physical end human capital. -InCanada, for8
instance,telatively scarce high-tech equipment, such as MRS'sotCT scanners,
is used intensively, while the proliferation of such equipment in the United
States results in considerable idle time. There are more physicians per
capita in Canada than in the United States, but there are many fewer who
specialize in complex surgical and diagnostic procedures. As a result, the
average Canadian specialist has a full workload, while his or her American
counterpart does not.9
The price that Canadians and Europeans pay for such controls is delay or
inconvenience in obtaining access to high-tech services, and in some cases not
receiving such services at all. Whether such delays or denials have a
significant effect on the health of the population is not known with
certainty; the limited evidence currently available suggests that they do not.
Another way that foreign countries with NHI contain costs is by using
their centralized buying power to squeeze down the prices of resources,
especially for drugs and physicians' services. Drug prices in the United
States usually contain significant monopoly rents as evidenced by the
willingness of the drug manuiacturers to sell the identical products overseas
at much lower prices.
Canadian and European physicians do not enjoy as high net incomes as do
American physicians, even after adjustment for international differences in
the general level of wages. But this does not mean that American physicians
are more satisfied with their lot or that American medical schools find it
easier to attract high quality, well motivated applicants. Compared to
physicians in most countries with NHI, American physicians suffer more
bureaucratic supervision from public and private insurance plans and more
interference with the day-to-day practice of medicine.It is important not to overestimate the amount of money that can be
saved by squeezing physicians. In the United States physicimns' net incomes
account for approximately lOX of dl health care spending. Suppose these
incomes could be reduced by 20% (the approximate differential between the
United States and Canada after adjusting for specialty mix, the exchange rate,
and the generml level of wages).1° The saving would be 2% of health care
spending, and even this is not a saving of real resources but only a money
transfer from physicians to patients and taxpayers.
Cost containment under 1*11 often relies on single source funding set
prospectively. An example is the global budget given to each Canadian
hospital et the beginning of each year. Samuel Johnson said, "When a man
knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind
wonderfully."" Much the same seems to be true of health care. When
physicians and hospital administrators know that there is a certain pool of
resources at their disposal and that no more will be forthcoming, they seem to
figure out ways to do the job with what they have. To be sure, this
inevitably involves limitation of some services, but most health profesaionals
prefer having some control over the allocation of the scarce resources that
are available to them.
MIII and Health
Does NHI improve the health of the population by increaaing acceaa to
care? Or does it worsen health by constraining the introduction of new
technology and destroying incentives for physicians and hospitals? There is
no conclusive answer to this queation; in my judgment MIII has little effect on
health one way or the other.1210
With regard to the other stated health goal- -thereduction of
differentials in health outcomes within a country- -the evidence is more
compelling. Universal coverage for medical care does not eliminate or even
substantially reduce differentials across socioeconomic groups. In England,
for instance, infant mortality in the lowest socioeconomic class is double the
rate of the highest class, just as it was prior to the introduction of NHI.'3
The relatively homogeneous populations of Scandinavia not only enjoy universal
coverage for health care, but also have many other egalitsrian social
programs. Nevertheless, life expectancy varies considerably across
occupations; the age-standardized mortality ratio for male hotel, restsursnt,
and food service workers is double that of teachers and technical workers.14
In Sweden a study of age-standardized death rates among employed men ages 45-
64 found substantial differentials across occupations in 1966-70 and slightly
greater differentials in l97680.15 The author adds "There is no ayatematic
evidence that the health care system is inequitable in the sense that those in
greater need get leas care, or that there are barriers towards the lower
socioeconomic groups" (p. 13)11
Is the failure of NHI to eliminate or reduce mortality differentials a
decisive argument against ita adoption? Nor necessarily. Bruce Viadeck
argues that curing disease and improving functional outcomes are not the only
benefits of medical care. He writes "We expect the health system to take care
of sick people whether or not they are going to get better, aa much for our
benefit aa theirs. 16 The caring and validation services provided by health
professionals have value even when they do not change health outcomes.1711
Prospects for Willinthe United States
-
Whatchanges hsve occurred since 1976 that might modify the relevance of
the four reasons I advanced to explain the absence of Will in the United
States?
1) Distrust of aovernment. It seems likely that the typical American's
distrust of government is stronger now thsn it was in the mid-l970s. Jimmy
Carter was elected as an "outsider," and he did little to enhance the image of
the Presidency or of government in general during his four years in office.
Ronald Reagan maintained an anti-government posture throughout his two terms.
Ceorge Bush may be more pragmatic and less- ideological, but he still commands
wide support with the message "government is the problem, not the solution."
Can our political institutions deal with a complex problem such as
health care efficiently and honestly? The recent experience with the savings
and loan industry provides ample cause for concern. This debacle did not,
like a major earthquake, come upon us suddenly. It was a well-diagnosed,
localized cancer that government allowed to metastasize to its present level.
What is particularly disturbing is that the blame cannot be laid at the door
of one political party- -both Democrats and Republicans helped the cancer to
spread. Moreover, it was not the fault of just one branch of government; both
Congress and the Executive Branch are fully implicated. Finally, it was not
just the Federal government that was derelict; state regulstory agencies and
state legislatures also failed to meet their responsibilities to the public.
Our government is built on checks and balances: by political parties,
by branches of government, and by levels of government. If these checks and
balances failed so badly with savings and loans, many observers wonder how12
well they would do with health care, which is so much lsrger, so much more
complex, and so much more vulnerable to mismanagement and dishonesty.
2) Heteroreneity of the population. In 1976 I argued that the
heterogeneity of the U.S. population helped explain a reluctance to embrace
NUT. Unlike the Swedes, Germans, Japanese, and many other "peoples," moat
Ameticans do not ahare centuries of common language, culture, and tradition;
thus there is less sense of national identification and empathy. In 1991 this
explanation probably has even more force. The celebration of "multicultural-
ism" in the United States in the past fifteen years appears to have led to a
heightened sense of separateness among the country's many ethni, religious,
and racial groups. Glorification of the "pluribua" at the expense of the
"unuis" does not enhance the prospects for NUT.
Heterogeneity of values also fuels the resistance to NUT. No nation
should expect or desire uniformity of opinion, but the name-calling and
physical violence that often accompany debates in the United States over
values undermines the ability of the nation to undertake collective efforts
for collective well-being. Americans might consider the words of the British
historian, R. H. Tawney, "The condition of effective action in a complex
civilization is cooperation. And the condition of cooperation is agreement,
both as to the ends to which efforts should be applied and the criteria by
which its success is to be judged. 18
3) A robust voluntary sector. America has always been distinguished
from most other nations by its highly developed private, nonprofit
institutions devoted to health, education, and social services. These
institutions, often founded and supported by religious groups, perform many of
the functions that government undertakes in other countriea. During the past13
fifteen years, however, the ability of nonprofit hospitals and the Blue Cross-
Blue Shield organizations to provide a form of social insurance through free
care, cost shifting, and community rating of inaursnce premiums, has been
seriously compromised. The "competition revolution"19 has imposed the
casualty approach to health insurance aa a condition for survival. The growth
of PPOs, Ii!40a, and tough bargaining by all third-party payora has sharply
diminished the capacity of nonprofit institutions to act aa rediatributive
agents. The declining importance of philanthropy relative to private and
public health insurance also decreases the ability of the nonprofit
institutions to act as quasi-governmental agencies. In heslth care the
"thousand points of light" are fainter now than in the past.I conclude that
the "voluntary sector" explanation for the absence of NHT in the United States
has less force in the l990s than it had in an earlier ers.
4 Less "noblesse oblige". The two central ideological forces of
American society hsve been a commitment to individusl freedom and a
commitment, at least in the abstract, to equality. There has always been a
tension between these forces, with the emphasis on individual opportunity and
achievement prevailing most of the time, but the egalitarian emphasis much in
evidence in the l930s and 1960s. Even the egalitarian ideology, however, has
focused more on equality of social status, equality under the law, and
equality of opportunity, than on equality of outcomes. Becsuse so many
Americsns of humble origins could and did mchimve weslth and position, the
sense of "noblesse oblige" that motivates many of the well-born in othet
countries to vote for social programs to aid the less fortunate has never been
as evident in the United States.14
How have the developments of the past fifteen years affected this
explanation? I find it difficult to judge, but suspect that it may be
slightly more relevant today. During the l9BOs the rhetotic of most of the
Aaerican right wing was "laissez-faire," not "Tory conservetive," Moreover,
the left wing's infatuation with the vocabulary of "rights" (divorced from
obligations) often diminishes rather than enhances e feeling of mutual
responsibility.
In summary, the distrust of government and the population heterogeneity
explanations are probably more relevant today than in 1976, and the lack pf
nohlesse oblige may be more relevant. Only one explanation- -therobustness of
the voluntary sector- -isdefinitely weaker now. It is ironic that the
"competition revolution," which erodes the ability of not-for-profit health
care institutions to provide a modicum of social insurance, may prove to be a
significant factor leading the country toward Nh.
Will the United States adopt NIH? In my view the prospects in the short
run are poor. The forces actively opposed to NHI are strong, well organized,
and have a clear sense of what they don't want. The forces actively in favor
are relatively weak, disorganized, end frequently at odds regarding the
reasons for wanting MIII or the best way to obtain it. The great majority of
Americans are not actively involved in the debate one way or the other, but
tend to be opposed for the reasons I have indicated. Some public opinion
polls seem to indicate a readiness for MIII, but they are not credible
indicators of political behavior. For example, one recent survey of business
executives reports that they believe the high cost of health cere to be
Ametica's most serious problem. At the same time business executives15
overwhelmingly approve of President Bush, who has not made reduction of health
care costs a high priority for his administration.
In the long run, MIII is far from dead; the need to curb cost while
extending coverage will continue to push the country in that direction. The
process will accelerate as nonprofit health care institutions lose their
ability to provide some social insurance as an alternative to MIII. Moreover,
the current trend of basing insurance premiums on expected utilization will
strike more people as unjust because most disease will be found to have a
significant genetic component. Also, as employer hiring decisions and
employee job choices become increasingly constrained by health insurance
considarations, there will be more appreciation of the efficiency advantages
of making health insurance independent of the labor market.
The timing of adoption of MIII will depend largely on factors external to
health care. Major changes in health policy, like major policy changes in any
area, are political acts, undertaken for political purposes. That was true
when Biamarck introduced MIII to the new German state over a hundred years ago.
It was true when England adopted MIII after World War II, and it will be true
in the United States as well. MIII will probably come to the United States in
the wake of a major change in the political climate, the kind of change that
often accompanies a war, a depression, or large-scale civil unrest. Short of
that, we should expect modest attempts to increase coverage and contain costs,
accompanied by an immodest amount of "aound and fury."16
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